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War

Here’s an odd patriotic note as we head into the Independence Day weekend: Between the Great Lakes battles and the riverine engagements of the Civil War, the United States had seen more significant inland naval combat than any other nation on earth. China has the Battle of the Red Cliffs, East Africa the Battle for Lake Tanganyika, but no one can match the extent and importance of our fresh-water operations.

(We share the Great Lakes battles (which include Lake Champlain for these purposes) with Canada, but they don’t have the Civil War experience. And hey, we could throw in the riverine operations in Vietnam for good measure.)

 

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Dust is dangerous. Anyone who works in a grain elevator or a sugar refinery knows this. When dust reaches a certain concentration in the air, the atmosphere becomes literally explosive. A spark ignites one mote of dust, which then ignites its neighbors, which ignite their neighbors, all of this happening in microseconds, until the room erupts with the collective force.

Our world is roomful of dust. There is now a broad band of conflict stretching from the Mediterranean/Black Sea to the Sea of Japan. In that band are numerous points of antagonism. Any one of them could be the spark that lights the explosion.

The reason I bring this up is that it hit me recently that there was no single World War II. There was no inherent connection between the war in Europe from 1939 to 1945 and the war in Asia from 1937 to 1948. They were two separate conflicts that coincided, because the world had grown “war-ish.” By that I mean the idea of putting armies on the march and violating borders by invasion had become thinkable, eventually typical. Once that mindset was in place, events took momentum of their own, going in directions that no one could foresee.

I worry we are getting close to a recurrence of that spiral.

Since the end of the Cold War, the overwhelming size of the American military has put a blanket on open international warfare. The U.S. Defense budget is the size of the next five largest military budgets in the world plus. There’s nothing like it. By that score, it’s difficult to imagine any nation’s decision makers thinking themselves capable of going on the offensive.

However, that very power makes the U.S. resented. One possible scenario is that China, facing economic troubles and wanting to distract the masses by foreign expansion, decides it is simply no longer willing to endure being limited by American squeamishness, and attacks anyway. If this sound familiar, it’s a contracted version of what happened in Japan between 1932 and 1941. Should China attack Japan, Taiwan or the Philippines, the U.S. will certainly intervene. Even Bernie Sanders or Ralph Nader would feel compelled to strike back under those circumstances.

With that occupying the American war machine in the Pacific, Putin may decide that he will never get a better opportunity to strike in Europe. This would not be an all-out war of conquest. It would be an attempt to impose an atmosphere of co-operation with Russian foreign policy objectives, along with annexation of Belarus and the rest of Ukraine (and the Baltics, if he can get away with it). The main idea would be to cow Western/Central Europe and stop the current drift toward anti-Russian unity (as demonstrated by Sweden and Finland seeking to join NATO). Europe would fight—but it’s hard to say to what degree, and how much support an already burdened US could give them.

And then what becomes of the Saudi/Iran conflict or Indo-Pakistani tensions? We can’t know. It’s impossible to tell how any war will turn out until you fight it. Warfare is inherently chaotic and unpredictable. Might turn out that the Russian economy has less warmaking potential than it seems. Or that might turn out to be the case for the U.S.. Or here’s an odd one: China goes to war with Japan and the South Koreans swing in on the Chinese side. Unlikely, but not impossible. The Korean people consider Japan to be a threat, and being in the middle the ROK govt would be under strong pressure to pick a side. Strange things will happen. The Nazi/Soviet pact that opened the gateway to the European theater seemed unthinkable right up to the moment it was announced. That’s when wars starts, when folks do something unexpected.

I remind myself that it once seemed inevitable that the Cold War would turn hot, yet that never happened. I’m hoping this is the case again. Dona nobis pacem. Dona nobis pacem. Dona nobis pacem. Amen.

Since this month is the quarter-century anniversary of the First Gulf War:

In the early summer of 1990, my father taught me how to drive. Franklin County, New York is threaded with semiuninhabited back roads, excellent for the novice driver, and we spent hours practicing, me driving, us talking. Among the things we talked about was the situation then developing in the Middle East. Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq, was threatening to invade the tiny, oil-rich Emirate of Kuwait. America’s pundit class was talking itself hoarse in debate as to whether or not he had the guts to go through with it.

Yes, he will, I said, with the excitement of an adolescent who thinks they’re onto something. I had read a profile of the man in a recent Reader’s Digest. It had described him as a gambler, akin to Hitler in that way, a man who would keep on taking risks until he was bodily prevented from doing so. To my eye, that seemed perfectly astute.

No, he won’t, my father replied, with the weariness of a man who’s seen too much power politics in his lifetime. He just got off a treasury-draining, army-destroying, eight-year war with Iran. If he’s managed to stay dictator this long, he must have sense enough to know the United States government would never allow him to get away with it. Nothing’s going to happen.

My father was absolutely right. It was absurd of me to think (on the basis of a Reader’s Digest article!) that Saddam Hussein was that foolish. I was indulging my teenage sense of wanting events to be more dramatic than they were. Anyone with an ounce of brains could tell that despite all the saber rattling, the man astute enough to be a dictator for so long would know he was taking an unwinnable risk.

That fact that Saddam Hussein did indeed invade Kuwait is irrelevant.

‘Cause really, what the hell was he thinking? I really do want to know. There was, around 1990, some talk about how the end of the Cold War meant the decline of both superpowers, that the U.S., saddled with strategic overstretch and a massive deficit, was on the fade as much as the U.S.S.R.. I suppose Hussein convinced himself that was true. I know that in the run-up to the First Gulf War, the Iraqi government released a transcript of a conversation between him and American ambassador April Glaspie, during which she appeared to state that the U.S. would stay neutral. Maybe Hussein convinced himself that was true.

Granted, nobody predicted Bush. George Bush was the man America elected because Ronald Reagan couldn’t have a third term. He was one of the last scions of the old WASP ruling class who climbed to power simply because they were used to it. It was difficult to take him seriously. Yet this George Bush and his team put together the greatest accomplishment in American diplomacy since the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the most impressive feat of American arms since MacArthur’s breakout from Pusan in 1950.

There was no reason to think any of this coming. It was all ridiculous. History is like that.

This question of Saddam’s intentions in the first war is matched with the question of Bush Jr’s intentions in the second. In both cases, the stated reasons cannot possibly be the whole story. So on what actual ideas were staked the fate of nations and the lives of millions? We don’t get to know. You and I, here in the realm of the common person, only get to live the consequences. We don’t even have the dignity of finding out what we’re being used for.

I’d like to just know. I really want to know.